Abstract
Introduction
In many practical situations, the relative quality of different future situations can be described by a well-defined objective function: the larger the value of the objective function, the better the situation. For example, in the investment situations, the value of the investment at a certain future date is the objective function characterizing different situations: the larger this value, the better.
In these terms, if we have to decide between different situations, we should select the situation with the largest value of the corresponding objective function.
This same approach can be used when we decide between different possible actions. In the ideal case when we know the exact consequences of each action a i , we can therefore predict the situation that arises from each action, and estimate the value v i of the objective function corresponding to this situation. In this ideal case, an action a i with the larger value v i is preferable to the action a j with a smaller value v j . If we have to decided between different actions a 1 , . . . , a n , then we select the action a i with the largest possible value of v i .
In practice, we rarely know the exact consequences of different actions a i . In this case, we do not know the exact value v i of the objective function; at best, we know the bounds v i and v i for this value: v i ≤ v i ≤ v i . The first natural question is: under this uncertainty, how should we select an appropriate action?
One of the ways to select such an action is known as the Hurwicz optimism-pessimism approach: we find a value α ∈ [0, 1] that describe the user's degree of optimism, and select the alternative for which the value α · v i + (1 − α) · v i is the largest possible.
There are some justifications for this approach, but researchers do not consider these justifications fully satisfactory. In this paper, we provide a new (hopefully, more satisfactory) justification for the Hurwicz approach.
The next natural question is: how to combine preferences of different users, users that have different degrees of optimism? This problem is also analyzed in this paper.
Formulation of the Problem
Decision making in the absence of uncertainty. Often, in decision making, we know what quantity we want to maximize (or minimize) under certain constraints. In other words, we know the objective function that we want to maximize (or minimize). For example, in running a business, we usually maximize profits -within given social and environmental constraints. When planning a trip by car, we usually minimize the travel time -within given constraints describing convenience etc. When planning a trip by plane, many of us minimize the travel cost, etc.
As an example, let us assume that we have two alternatives a 1 and a 2 . Let us also assume that we know the exact values v 1 and v 2 of the (maximized) objective function for these alternatives: if we select the alternative a 1 , then the value of the objective function characterizing the user's preference is v 1 ; and if we select the alternative a 2 , then the value of the objective function characterizing the user's preference is v 2 .
In this situation, the decision is easy:
• if v 1 > v 2 , we should select alternative a 1 ;
• if v 1 < v 2 , we should select alternative a 2 ;
• if v 1 = v 2 , we can select any of the two alternatives, the result will be the same. • the value α = 1 means that when we make a decision, we only take into account the best possible outcome v i ; this risk-prone behavior corresponds to optimism;
• the value α = 0 means that when we make a decision, we only take into account the worst possible outcome v i ; this risk-averse behavior corresponds to pessimism;
• values α ∈ (0, 1) mean that we take into account both the best and the worst possible outcomes; the corresponding value α describes the weight of the best possible outcome.
Our second result: group decision making. In group decision making, we have people with different behaviors. So, if we have two alternatives a 1 and a 2 , different people will select different alternatives. In such a situation, the portion of people who selected a 1 is a reasonable indication of how better a 1 is for this group. In other words, instead of a single yes-no answer (a 1 is better or a 2 is better), we should generate a number p(a 1 > a 2 ) characterizing the degree to which a 1 is better than a 2 . In this paper, we will derive such a formula.
Individual decision making under interval uncertainty:
a new justification of Hurwicz criterion. We need to have a linear (= total) (pre-)order on the set of all intervals (degenerate or non-degenerate), i.e., an order in which for every two intervals
Another reasonable requirement is that if v n v n for all n, then in the limit n → ∞, when v n → v and v n → v , we should also have v v . Indeed, from the practical viewpoint, the fact that v n → v means that whatever accuracy we choose, when n is large enough, then v n is indistinguishable from v within this accuracy. In practice, we always estimate consequences of our actions with some uncertainty. Thus, in practice, when n is large enough, v is indistinguishable from v n and v from v n . Since v n v n , we can thus conclude that v v .
It is also reasonable to require that the order should not depend on the choice of a starting value or a measuring unit for measuring v. For example, when we compare intervals for profits, the results of this comparison should not change whether we count profit in dollars or in euros, and whether we compare profits themselves or differences between the profit and some predicted value v 0 . In precise terms, changing a starting point from 0 to v 0 means subtracting v 0 , and changing a unit to a new one which is λ times smaller means multiplying all numerical values by λ. Thus, we arrive at the following definitions.
Definition 1.
By an interval order, we mean a transitive symmetric relation on the set of all (degenerate or nondegenerate) intervals for which:
• for every two intervals v 1 and v 2 , either v 1 v 2 or v 2 v 1 (or both);
Definition 2. We say that an interval order is
closed if v n v n , v n → v, and v n → v imply that v v .
Definition 3. We say that an interval order is shift-and scale-invariant if for every
v 0 and λ > 0, [v 1 , v 1 ] [v 2 , v 2 ] implies [λ · v 1 + v 0 , λ · v 1 + v 0 ] [λ · v 2 + v 0 , λ · v 2 + v 0 ].
Proposition 1. For every closed shift-and scale-invariant interval order, there exists a constant
Discussion. In other words, every closed and invariant interval order can be described by some Hurwicz criterion. Vice versa, for every α, the corresponding interval order is closed and invariant. Thus, for individual decision making, we should use Hurwicz criterion.
Comment. It is worth mentioning that there exist alternative justifications of Hurwicz criterion; see, e.g., [6, 8] .
Mathematical comment. Strictly speaking, for every α ∈ [0, 1], the corresponding relation
is a pre-order, not an order. Note that, for an order, a b and b a imply that a = b. Let us show that for the above relation, this is not true for the intervals
Indeed, for these intervals, we have
Thus, for these two intervals, we have
Similarly, we have
Proof. Let be a closed invariant interval order.
1
•
Similarly, if x ≤ x in the sense of the normal order between real numbers, i.e., if x > x , then, according to the definition of an interval order, we should have
in the sense of the normal ordering between real numbers, then we also have x x in the sense of the interval order.
Thus, on real numbers, the interval order coincides with the usual one.
2
• . Let us now start extending this order to non-degenerate intervals by considering the simplest non-degenerate interval, e.g., the interval By definition of the supremum, every element of S is ≤ α, and for every ε > 0, there exists a value x n > α − ε for which x n ∈ S, i.e., for which x n [0, 1]. In the limit ε → 0, from α − ε ≤ x n ≤ α, we conclude that x n → α. Thus, from the fact that ≤ is closed, we conclude that
Since α is the supremum, for every ε > 0, we have α + ε ∈ S, i.e., α + ε 
3
• . Now, we are ready to handle arbitrary non-degenerate intervals.
For every non-degenerate interval
Thus, using the invariance of , we conclude that
This expression is exactly equal to Hurwicz's expression α · v + (1 − α) · v. Thus, each interval is equivalent to its Hurwicz value.
Since for real numbers, the interval order coincides with the standard order between real numbers, we conclude that an interval v 2 is "preferable" (in the sense of the interval order) than v 1 if and only if the Hurwicz value corresponding to v 2 is larger than the Hurwicz value corresponding to v 1 .
The proposition is proven.
Towards Group Decision Making under Interval Uncertainty
Formulation of the problem. 
So, in this case, all individuals will select [v 2 , v 2 ], i.e., the portion is 1.
Cases when answer is not straightforward. In other cases, e.g., when v 2 < v 1 < v 1 < v 2 , the selection depends on α: for an optimist α = 1, v 2 is better, but for a pessimist, v 1 is better. In such situations, the desired portion depends on the distribution of values α.
Setting
It is reasonable to describe this distribution by using a (cumulative) distribution function. Specifically, for every α 0 , let F (α) denote the portion of individuals for whom α ≤ α 0 , and let F − (α) denote the portion of individuals for whom α < α 0 . In these terms, the portion of individuals for whom α ≥ α 0 is equal to 1 − F − (α 0 ). 
Proposition 2. Let F (α) be a cumulative distribution function on the interval
Then, the probability P 2 that
is equal to the following:
• When w 1 < w 2 , we have
, where
• When w 1 > w 2 , we have
, and otherwise P 2 = F (t).
• When w 1 = w 2 , we have
Proof. If we open parentheses in the inequality
and move all the terms proportional to α to one side, we get an equivalent inequality
or, equivalently,
Let us consider all three cases from the formulation of the Proposition: w 2 > w 1 , w)1 < w 2 , and w 1 = w 2 .
Let us first consider the case w 2 > w 1 . In this case, the inequality for α is equivalent to
We will consider three subcases: t ≤ 0, t > 1, and 0 < t ≤ 1.
The first subcase is t ≤ 0. By definition of t, taking into account that we are in the case w 2 > w 1 , we conclude that the inequality t ≤ 0 is equivalent to v 1 ≤ v 2 . When t ≤ 0, then then the inequality α ≥ t holds for all α. Thus, the probability P 2 that this inequality is satisfied is equal to 1.
The second subcase if t > 1. Multiplying both sides of the inequality t > 1 by the positive value w 2 − w 1 , we conclude that t > 1 is equivalent to
Opening the parentheses and canceling terms v i in both sides, we get an equivalent form 0 > v 2 − v 1 , i.e., if v 2 < v 1 . When t > 1, then the inequality α ≥ t cannot hold for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the probability P 2 that this inequality holds is equal to 0.
The only remaining subcase is 0 < t ≤ 1. In this subcase, the desired probability P 2 is the probability that α ≥ t, i.e., P 2 = 1 − F − (t). Similar formulas can be described for the case when w 1 < w 2 .
When w 1 = w 2 , then for v 1 ≤ v 2 we have P 2 = 1, and for v 1 > v 2 we have P 2 = 0. The proposition is proven.
Comment.
One can see that the desired portion monotonically depends on the quantity t. In [2, 3] , the "degree of se-
.
One can easily see that t + 2d = 1, hence t = 1 − 2d, d = (1 − t)/2, and monotonic dependence on t means exactly monotonic dependence on d. Thus, we have justified the use of the empirical expression d.
In particular, for the case when w 1 < w 2 , and the distribution of α is uniform (i.e., F (α) = F − (α) = α for all α), the portion (when it is not equal to 0 or 1), is equal to 1 − F − (t) = 1 − t = 2d. Comment on selection between equal alternatives. In the above text, we deal with the portion P 1 of those who select v 1 , and with a portion P 2 of those who select v 2 . We have mentioned that those to whom v 1 and v 2 are equivalent are included in both counts, i.e., P 1 + P 2 ≥ 1 and it is possible that P 1 + P 2 > 1: e.g., if v 1 and v 2 are identical, we have P 1 = P 2 = 1 and P 1 + P 2 = 1.
When we compute the sum P 1 + P 2 , those who selected only v 1 or only v 2 are counted exactly once, but those who selected both are counted twice. Thus, P 1 + P 2 equals 1 plus the portion of those who selected both alternatives. Hence, the difference P 1 + P 2 − 1 is the portion of those who selected both, and the remaining portions P 1 −(P 1 +P 2 −1) = 1−P 2 and P 2 −(P 1 +P 2 −1) = 1−P 1 described those who selected only v 1 or only v 2 .
A reasonable alternative description is to assume that if for a person, two alternatives are equivalent, then this person will select one of them with probability 1 2 ; see, e.g., [2, 3] . In this case, the alternative v 1 will be accepted in a portion
and the alternative v 2 will be accepted in a portion
Auxiliary Result: Reasonable Distributions of Optimism Degree
Formulation of a problem. In the previous text, we did not make any assumptions about the distribution function F (α), and we got formulas which explicitly depend on this distribution. A natural question is: which distribution functions F (α) are possible? 
Alternatively, we can argue that now v is the new pessimistic estimate and v is the new optimistic estimate, so
Thus, the probability to have v ∈ [α, α] is equal to the probability that the optimismpessimism parameter α is in the interval
This probability is equal to
It is reasonable to require that these two ways should lead to exact same formula for the probability. As a result, we arrive at the following definition: 
Comment. This idea is similar to the one used in [7] in a similar situation. Comment. As we have mentioned, for this function F , the portions become proportional to formulas from [2, 3] .
Proof. Let us first consider the case when v = α = 0, v = x, and α = x · y for some x, y ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, the consistency condition takes the form
It is known (see, e.g., [1] ), that the only monotonic solutions of this functional equation are the functions F (x) = x k for some k > 0. So, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that k = 1. Indeed, let us now consider the case when v = α = 1/2, v = 1, and α = 1 + z 2 for some z ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, the consistency condition takes the form
Multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of the left-hand side by 2 k , we get
This equality must be true for all z ∈ [0, 1]. Differentiating by z and taking z = 0, we conclude that
The left-hand side of this limit equality is finite and positive, the right-hand side is 0 for k > 1 and infinite for k < 1. Thus, the only possible value is k = 1. The proposition is proven.
Conclusions and Future Work
Conclusions. In many practical situations, we do not know the exact consequences of different actions. The value α describes the user's degree of optimism.
We have also analyzed what will happen if the decision must be made a group, and different members of the group have different degrees of optimism.
• Once we know the probabilities of different values of α, we can then describe the probability of selecting different alternatives.
• We have also shown that if we have no information about the probability distribution of α, it is reasonable to assume that these values are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
Future work. In this paper, we considered two extreme cases: when we know the probability distribution of α, and when we have no information about this probability distribution at all. In practice, we sometimes have partial information about this probability distribution. In the future, it is desirable to consider group decision making under such partial information.
